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How Does Shared Capitalism 
Aﬀect Economic Performance 
in the United Kingdom?
Alex Bryson and Richard B. Freeman
There are three reasons for exploring the impact of shared capitalism—
employee shared ownership, payment via stock options, and proﬁ  t shar-
ing and related group incentive pay—on economic outcomes in the United 
Kingdom.
The ﬁ  rst is that shared capitalism is widespread. Table 6.1 shows the inci-
dence and coverage of the major shared capitalist modes of pay in Britain 
for private sector workplaces with ﬁ  ve or more employees in the 2004 Work-
place Employment Relations Survey. Around one-  ﬁ  fth of workplaces had 
some form of employee share ownership scheme. This is comparable to US 
ﬁ  gures as discussed in chapter 1. These schemes include the Save as You 
Earn (SAYE)—an all-  employee plan that gives workers tax breaks when 
they save to purchase their employer’s shares but that does not require that 
they purchase the shares; the share incentive plan (SIP)—an all-  employee 
scheme that oﬀers tax breaks for employees holding shares in the company 
for which they work; and the Company Share Option Plan (CSOP)—where 
companies can grant chosen employees or directors up to £30,000 of tax 
and national insurance advantaged share options. The majority of the stock 
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ownership plans are open to all nonmanagerial employees in part because 
the tax code usually requires such coverage to obtain tax breaks.
Turning to proﬁ  t sharing and related group incentive pay, one- quarter of 
workplaces had some form of proﬁ  t-  related pay for nonmanagerial employ-
ees, and one- quarter had some form of group- based payment by results, which 
is akin to gain sharing in the United States. This incidence is also compa-
rable to the United States as discussed in chapter 1. The vast majority of 
share ownership schemes and over two-  thirds of proﬁ  t-  related pay schemes 
cover all nonmanagerial employees. The percentage of employees with these 
schemes exceeds the percentage of workplaces with the schemes because 
larger workplaces are more likely to choose to pay workers in these ways.
The fourth row in the table combines the three group-  level performance 
pay methods into an additive scale that takes the value 0 if the ﬁ  rm has 
none of these methods, 1 if it has one, 2 if it has two, and 3 if it has all three 
methods. It shows that half the ﬁ  rms have at least one scheme and that 62 
percent of workers are covered by at least one scheme. Shared capitalism is, 
from this metric, as much part and parcel of the British capitalist economy 
Table 6.1  Percentage of workplaces and employees covered by shared capitalism in 
the United Kingdom, 2004
       Workplaces (%)   Employees (%)  
1. Stock ownership 20 32
  Share  schemes
    S I P 7 1 1
    SAYE 12 21
    CSOP 6 11
    Others,  including  EMI 3 6
  Coverage  of  schemes
    Managers  only 3 4
    1–99%  nonmanagerial 3 6
    100%  nonmanagerial 14 22
2. Group-  based payment by results 26 30
3. Proﬁ  t-  related pay
  Some 23 29
  1–99%  nonmanagerial 7 12
  100%  nonmanagerial 16 18
4. Number of schemes
  0 5 0 3 8
  1 2 7 3 0
  2 1 7 2 4
  3 6 9
5. Individual variable pay
    Pay for individual PBR 34 43
    Merit  pay   16   26  
Notes: Source Workplace Employment Relations Surveys. 2004 data relate to workplaces with 
5 employees. Details of the pay schemes are presented in the appendix.How Does Shared Capitalism Aﬀect Economic Performance in the UK?    2 0 3
as it is of the American economy, where almost half of workers are covered 
by at least one scheme (chapter 1).
The last row of the table gives the proportion of workplaces and employees 
who receive variable pay as individuals either through pay for performance 
or through merit pay. We treat these modes of payment separately because 
the “sharing” is related to individual performance as opposed to group per-
formance and is thus more akin to piece rate pay than proﬁ  t sharing.1
The second reason for examining shared capitalism in the United King-
dom is that the amount and nature of shared capitalist arrangements have 
changed over time. Proﬁ  t-  related pay and share-  ownership schemes grew 
in the 1980s, spurred by government tax incentives. Data from Pendleton, 
Whitﬁ  eld, and Bryson (2009, tables 5 and 6) on workplaces with twenty- ﬁ  ve 
employees or more show that the proportion of private sector workplaces 
with some shared capitalist scheme increased from 40 percent in 1984 to 63 
percent in 2004. The proportion of ﬁ  rms having proﬁ  t- related pay increased 
from 19 percent to 44 percent, the proportion having group pay for perfor-
mance increased from 15 percent to 25 percent, and the proportion having 
employee ownership increased from 22 percent to 28 percent.
The third reason is that the UK government has encouraged shared capi-
talist modes of pay with favorable tax treatment over time. In the 1980s the 
Conservative government gave tax advantages to proﬁ  t-  related pay. Since 
1997 the Labour government has given tax advantages to share ownership 
schemes at the expense of proﬁ  t-  related pay schemes, which became fully 
taxable.2 Unlike the United States, which gives tax breaks for collective 
ownership of shares through Employee Share Ownership Plans (ESOPs), 
the United Kingdom gives breaks for individual share ownership. The HM 
Revenue and Customs estimates that for 2002 and 2003 the Treasury spent 
about £800 million in tax relief per annum on these schemes (Oxera 2007a, 
3). To see whether this is justiﬁ  able the Treasury commissioned an exten-
sive econometric study of the impacts of shared capitalism on productivity 
(Oxera 2007a, 2007b), whose ﬁ  ndings we compare with ours shortly.
Our analyses use linked employer-  employee data from the British 2004 
Workplace Employment Relations Survey (WERS)3 to estimate the impact 
of shared capitalism on productivity and to assess some of the mechanisms 
by which it produces diﬀerent outcomes at diﬀerent workplaces. The 2004 
WERS provides cross-  sectional information on some 1,500 private sec-
tor workplaces obtained from HR managers and from employees work-
1. Factor analyses of the ﬁ  ve types of performance pay—individual payments-  by-  results, 
merit pay, group payments- by- results, share ownership, and proﬁ  t-  related pay—identiﬁ  ed two 
factors with eigenvalues above 1. Share ownership and proﬁ  t-  related pay load together, as do 
individual payments-  by-  results and merit pay. Group-  level payments-  by-  results had a lower 
loading, which was pretty similar across the two factors.
2.  For  details:  http:/ / www.hmrc.gov.uk/ stats/ emp_share_schemes/ menu.htm.
3. For full details of the survey see Kersley et al. (2006) and Chaplin et al. (2005).204    Alex Bryson and Richard B. Freeman
ing in those workplaces. With the survey weights used throughout results 
are nationally representative of workplaces with ﬁ  ve or more employees in 
Britain. These data provide an independent check on the results from the 
analysis of the General Social Survey and the NBER Shared Capitalism 
surveys used in previous chapters.
We ﬁ nd that:
1. Diﬀerent forms of shared capitalist pay complement each other in the 
sense that ﬁ  rms are more likely to have them in combinations than if they 
chose forms of pay independently.
2.  Firms change modes of compensation frequently, with some adopting 
schemes and others eliminating them so that the gross changes in schemes 
are far more numerous than the net changes.
3.  Shared capitalist pay is positively associated with other forms of pay 
and workplace arrangements: individual payment by results, employer 
reports of devolving decision making to employees, using subjective apprais-
als of worker performance, monitoring of outputs, and reduced monitoring 
of workers.
4. Firms with shared capitalist pay, particularly with share ownership 
schemes, have higher labor productivity than ﬁ  rms without such forms of 
pay. The impacts of shared capitalism on productivity are larger when the 
ﬁ  rm combines several schemes.
6.1    Conceptual  Issues
The traditional rationale for shared capitalist pay is that it aligns worker 
and employer objectives in maximizing output. To do this, shared capitalism 
must overcome free- rider problems associated with any group incentive sys-
tem and deal with the fact that virtually any contingent pay, including piece 
rates for individuals, gives incentives for some forms of desirable behavior 
but not for other forms.4 Principal/ agent problems are ubiquitous in a world 
where contracts are necessarily incomplete. These issues are addressed in 
chapter 2 in the discussion of anti-  shirking behavior.
Shared capitalism is normally associated with certain modes of work 
organization. Since ﬁ  rms that pay workers on the basis of ﬁ  rm or group 
performance do so in the hope of inducing them to take actions that improve 
ﬁ  rm performance, they are also likely to empower workers to make deci-
sions that aﬀect performance, particularly where the employee has private 
information about the production process. Group incentive pay may also be 
4. Annual proﬁ  t-  sharing bonuses may, for example, induce workers to try hard in the short 
run but to neglect activities that beneﬁ  t the ﬁ  rm over a longer horizon. Worker ownership 
whose beneﬁ  ts do not reach workers until they retire may fail to induce workers to try hard in 
the present. Piece rates or tournaments can reduce cooperation and the sharing of knowledge 
at workplaces and even induce one worker to sabotage a rival.How Does Shared Capitalism Aﬀect Economic Performance in the UK?    2 0 5
used as an incentive for workers to share their knowledge about the produc-
tion process with other workers and the employer (Levine and Tyson 1990; 
Jones 1987).
By contrast, giving workers greater decision-  making power absent ﬁ  nan-
cial incentives might adversely aﬀect motivation (Ben-  Avner and Jones 
1995): “they want me to do more without paying me more.” And giving 
shared capitalist pay without greater decision-  making power may also fail 
to aﬀect productivity: “they are making my income risky by varying my pay 
with performance without giving me autonomy to raise performance.”
Shared capitalist modes of pay should also be associated with a shift 
in management monitoring from watching what workers do to monitor-
ing their ﬁ  nal products. When the ﬁ  rm cannot readily observe eﬀort but 
can monitor outputs, incentive pay related to outputs will motivate eﬀort, 
substituting for monitoring eﬀort. Shared capitalism may provide workers 
an opportunity for extra pay by substituting for costly monitoring in situa-
tions where it is especially diﬃcult to monitor, which is consistent with gift 
exchange versions of eﬃciency wage theory. By contrast, when the ﬁ  rm ﬁ  nds 
it easier to monitor workers than to monitor output, we would expect the 
ﬁ  rm to use straight- time pay.5 Indeed, Frederick Taylor viewed output- based 
pay as a mechanism for the avoidance of shirking.6 The advent of informa-
tion and communication technologies (ICT)-  based monitoring, including 
on- line monitoring, electronic point- of- sale equipment, and electronic time 
recording gave management new tools to monitor previously diﬃcult- to-
  monitor jobs and output, potentially making this interaction more impor-
tant than in the past.7
Some analysts view individual pay for performance as the polar oppo-
site of group incentive pay. Individual pay for performance is a form of 
piece rate that induces employees to improve their personal output (and 
maybe to sabotage the output of others if that might improve their chances 
for a promotion), whereas group pay induces them to work cooperatively 
with others. Either you work for yourself or you work for the group. Under 
some conditions, the two forms of pay may indeed be antithetical but under 
others individual pay for performance can complement group incentive pay. 
Consider a situation in which maximizing output and proﬁ  ts requires that 
workers do their own work and also help others. In this case management 
will need two instruments to induce workers to spend some time working on 
5. Daniel and Millward (1983) argue “Traditionally the purpose of PBR systems of pay has 
been to encourage workers to increase eﬀort and output. . . . In practice . . . there has been a 
tendency for PBR to become more an instrument of management control designed to ensure 
consistency of output” (205).
6. Gallie, Felstead, and Green (1998) show that control of workers through close supervision, 
pay incentives, and appraisal systems all grew in Britain in the late 1980s and early 1990s.
7. White et al. (2004, 100) estimated that in 2002 ICT- based monitoring systems were “already 
covering around half the workforce and appear to be spreading rapidly.” Half of the workplaces 
with ICT monitoring were using it to evaluate individuals (96).206    Alex Bryson and Richard B. Freeman
their own and some time working cooperatively. Just as proﬁ  t-  seeking man-
agements mix imperfect objective measures of performance with subjective 
evaluation (Baker, Gibbons, Murphy 1994), management could mix pay for 
individual performance and pay for group performance to induce workers 
to undertake both activities. Management could even use individual pay for 
performance as a tool against the temptation to free-  ride on the group.
The most far- reaching hypothesis in recent analyses of the eﬀect of human 
resource management on productivity and labor practices is the “comple-
mentarities thesis” that advanced labor practices work most eﬀectively when 
bundled together into a consistent high- performance workplace (Ichniowski 
et al. 1996; Pil and MacDuﬃe 1996). This hypothesis implies that ﬁ  rms 
should adopt shared capitalist modes of pay and complementary forms of 
work organization as a package rather than introducing them individually. 
Some analysts go further and link shared capitalism with the ﬁ  rm’s com-
petitive strategy (Huselid 1995; Schuler and Jackson 1987). They argue that 
ﬁ  rms that compete on the basis of the quality of output should be more 
attuned to group incentives than ﬁ  rms that compete on the basis of low cost 
of generic output, where piece rates might be more eﬀective.
We examine the notion that shared capitalist modes of pay and work 
organization has important complementarities in two ways.
First, we test whether ﬁ  rms choose combinations of pay schemes in pro-
portions that diverge from what we would expect had they chosen them as in-
dependent draws from separate urns. Under the null hypothesis, if 50 percent 
of ﬁ  rms have proﬁ  t sharing and 50 percent have employee share ownership, 
the proportion of ﬁ  rms with both proﬁ  t sharing and employee ownership 
would be 25 percent. If the complementary hypothesis is correct, the propor-
tion of ﬁ  rms with both practices would exceed 25 percent, whereas if the 
forms are substitutes, the proportion with both practices would fall short of 
25 percent. Using a regression design, we also examine whether individual 
pay for results, managerial monitoring, and worker decision making are 
related to shared capitalist modes of pay, other factors held ﬁ  xed. If the 
complementary hypothesis is correct, the shared capitalist practices should 
have positive eﬀects on worker-  friendly practices and negative eﬀects on 
hierarchical control practices.
Second, we follow the bulk of the complementary literature by estimating 
production functions that relate output to inputs, including modes of com-
pensation, and test for complementary relations among modes of compensa-
tion. If the complementary hypothesis is correct, shared capitalist practices 
X and Z will have greater eﬀects on output when they operate together than 
when they operate separately. This implies that the regression coeﬃcient on 
interaction terms such as their product XZ should be positive.
As with other production function models, without identiﬁ  ably exogenous 
variation in input variables—in this case shared capitalist pay as well as capi-
tal and labor inputs—the regression results are best interpreted as reﬂ  ecting How Does Shared Capitalism Aﬀect Economic Performance in the UK?    2 0 7
associations among endogenous variables. Depending on the heterogeneity 
among ﬁ  rms, moreover, the associations could be aﬀected by selectivity and 
thus diﬀer from the associations we would get from randomly assigning 
compensation and practices among ﬁ  rms. Still, our two-  part analysis—
looking for complementary links in the combinations of shared capitalist 
modes of pay and looking for such links in production functions—provides 
a stronger test of the hypothesized positive eﬀect of shared capitalism on 
outputs than would analysis of either combinations or production functions 
separately.
6.2    Combinations  of  Practices
Figure 6.1 uses a Venn diagram to display the incidence of combinations 
of proﬁ  t- related pay, share ownership, and group- based incentives in private 
sector workplaces with ﬁ  ve or more employees in the WERS 2004 data. Our 
test of complementarity in these data compares those proportions with the 
proportions that would result if the ﬁ  rm selected practices independently 
on the basis of the proportion in the entire sample. The bottom part of the 
ﬁ  gure gives the actual incidence of each element in the diagram and the 
incidence we would expect from the binomial distribution of independent 
draws based on the proportion of each mode in the population. Half of the 
workplaces have no group-  based incentive payments, which is statistically 
signiﬁ  cantly diﬀerent from the 39 percent predicted from the independent 
hypothesis. Twenty-  seven percent had one scheme compared to 43.5 per-
cent predicted to have a single scheme; 17 percent of workplaces had two 
schemes, which is close to the 15.5 percent predicted to have two schemes, but 
6.2 percent had all three schemes, which is over three times the 1.7 percent 
predicted to have three schemes. Thus, there were more workplaces at the 
extremes of the distribution than predicted, which is consistent with the idea 
that these schemes are complementary (although it is possible that manage-
rial preferences or some other dynamic is at work).
Using the 1984 Workplace Industrial Relations Survey, which surveyed 
workplaces with twenty- ﬁ  ve or more employees, we made similar computa-
tions for that year. These data show a pattern that is similar to that in 2004, 
albeit with much lower levels of the use of the various schemes. In 1984, 59.5 
percent of workplaces had no form of shared capitalist pay compared to a 
predicted level of 52.9 percent; 25.3 percent had one form of the pay com-
pared to a predicted 36.6 percent, whereas 13.7 percent had two such forms 
compared to a predicted 9.2 percent while 1.4 percent had three such forms 
compared to a predicted 0.7 percent. More workplaces had two or three 
forms of shared capitalist pay and more had zero forms of shared capital-
ist pay than predicted. In sum, the calculations for 1984 as well as for 2004 
reject the null hypothesis that workplaces select shared capitalist modes of 
compensation independently in favor of the complementary hypothesis.208    Alex Bryson and Richard B. Freeman
6.3      Changes in Modes of Pay
The 2004 WERS Panel provides panel data on a random subset of a 
nationally representative sample of workplaces with ten or more employees 
that the survey interviewed in 1998. The longitudinal ﬁ  le allows us to exam-
ine changes in shared capitalist modes of compensation over time. Rows 1 
and 2 of table 6.2 record the incidence of diﬀerent schemes in the panel data 
in 1998 and 2004. We diﬀerentiate the deferred proﬁ  t-  related pay systems 
from the others to highlight the fact that the incidence of proﬁ  t-  related 
pay declined due to the cessation of the tax advantage given to deferred 
Fig. 6.1    Incidence of combinations of shared capitalist pay schemes, WERS 2004 
(workplaces with ﬁ  ve or more employees)
Actual and predicted incidence of Share Capitalism PracticesHow Does Shared Capitalism Aﬀect Economic Performance in the UK?    2 0 9
proﬁ  t- related pay schemes. The percentage with other proﬁ  t-  related schemes 
remained constant at 42 percent; the percentage of workplaces with employee 
share ownership schemes also remained stable, so that the primary increase 
in shared capitalist modes of compensation occurred through a 10 percent-
age point increase in group payments by results. The net change ﬁ  gures in 
row 3 show rather modest changes in the overall distribution.
But the part of the table labeled “changes in distribution” shows that 
beneath the stability in the nondeferred performance-  related pay (PRP) 
schemes and in the employee share ownership schemes there is consider-
able switching among schemes by workplaces. Underlying the 42 percent 
constant proportion of workplaces with proﬁ  t-  related pay exclusive of the 
deferred schemes are shifts in nearly one- third of the workplaces: 15 percent 
of workplaces adopted proﬁ  t-  related pay while 15 percent ended schemes 
other than the deferred ones that lost tax privileges. Similarly, underlying the 
20 percent constant percentage of workplaces with Employee Share Own-
ership Schemes (ESOS) is a change in 19 percent of workplaces. Even the 
group payments-  by-  results, which increased by 10 percentage points from 
1998 to 2004, show a gross change of 27 percentage points.
How should we interpret this huge diﬀerence between net and gross 
changes? One interpretation of the high amount of switching is that it re-
ﬂ  ects experimentation on the part of employers in search of the best arrange-
Table 6.2  The distribution of shared capitalist forms of pay and proportion of workplaces 
changing their form of pay, 1998–2004 Panel of private sector workplaces with ten 
or more employees


















    Distribution of all workplaces in 
  1998
42 47 20 48 23
    Distribution of all workplaces in 
  2004
42 42 20 49 33
  Net  change  0 –5  0  1 10
Changes in distribution
    Did not have program in 1998 
  nor  2004
43 40 71 37 58
    Added program between 1998 
  and  2004
15 18  9 14 9
    Had program in 1998 but 
    dropped it by 2004
15 13 10 15 18
    Had program in both 1998 and 
  2004
27 29 11 34 15
  Gross  change   30   31   19   29   27
Source: Workplace Employment Relations Panel Survey 1998–2004.210    Alex Bryson and Richard B. Freeman
ments. Another interpretation is that ﬁ  rms change practices because the 
optimal compensation system changes, perhaps because what matters to 
employers is the “newness” of a scheme rather than the attributes of a par-
ticular payment method. Whichever interpretation is right, it would seem 
that these changes are not major overhauls in employer practices, implying 
that the treatments and the inputs required to maintain them are unlikely 
to be large—that is, switching costs are low.
The substantial amount of switching may create problems for employee 
expectations. Employee cooperation may be encouraged by stable, well-
  known plans that create a common understanding of how employees will 
be rewarded. Shared capitalism can then help to cement long-  term bonds 
between the employer and employees, and dropping or substantially altering 
these plans may undo the common understanding that underlies better per-
formance. On the other hand, switching plans may be warranted when the 
plans are not working as initially intended, and a new formula or method is 
needed to reward the right behaviors. In many cases the switching may not 
disrupt the perceived commitment of a ﬁ  rm to shared capitalism, but simply 
reﬂ  ect experimentation to ﬁ  nd the right approach.
To see how the shifts in programs among workplaces might work them-
selves out in the long run, we have applied Markov chain analysis to the 
1998 to 2004 panel data. Speciﬁ  cally, we organized the data into transition 
matrices whose elements are the probabilities of moving from a given com-
bination of practices to other combinations and, on the assumption that the 
transition probabilities are constant, estimated the equilibrium or steady 
state distribution of practices.
Table 6.3 records our results. Panel A deﬁ  nes the state variables simply as 
the number of shared capitalist pay programs at a workplace. Since there 
are four possible states, from zero to three programs, the transition matrix 
is 4 by 4. We raised the matrix to the power 2000 to obtain the steady state 
distribution. The columns labeled 1998 and 2004 give the proportion of 
workplaces with the speciﬁ  ed numbers of programs in each year, while the 
column labeled equilibrium is our estimated steady state distribution. It 
“predicts” that the number of workplaces with two to three programs will 
rise while the numbers with one program will remain nearly constant, so 
that shared capitalism will increase gradually over time. Panel B deﬁ  nes the 
state variables as each of the combinations in our Venn diagram. Since in 
this case there are eight possible states, the transition matrix is 8 by 8. The 
calculations here tell a similar but more detailed story about change. The 
Markov analysis predicts a drop in the proportion of workplaces with only 
ESOS in contrast to the increase in that proportion from 1998 to 2004 and 
an increase in the proportion with ESOS and proﬁ  t-  related pay in contrast 
to the decrease in that proportion from 1998 to 2004.
Consistent with the analysis of the 2004 patterns in ﬁ  gure 6.1, the anal-
ysis of the panel data supports the complementarity hypothesis, with the 
number of workplaces having all three programs and the number expected How Does Shared Capitalism Aﬀect Economic Performance in the UK?    2 1 1
to have more in the future exceeding the number that would be found if ﬁ  rms 
selected the modes of compensation independently.
6.4      Relation to Other Workplace Practices
To examine the relation between shared capitalism and other workplace 
policies and practices—individual payment by result, worker autonomy, 
and managerial monitoring of work activity, outputs, and appraisals—we 
use a linear regression model. The dependent variables in the regression 
are the measures of workplace policies and practices. The key independent 
variables are the forms of shared capitalist compensation.8 The regressions 
hold ﬁ  xed factors such as industry, size of the workplace, size of ﬁ  rm, and 
the like.
Table 6.4 presents the regression coeﬃcients on dummy variables for 
employee stock ownership, group payment by results, and proﬁ  t-  related 
Table 6.3  Markov chain analysis of equilibrium distribution of shared capitalist 
modes of pay
      1998  2004   Equilibrium  
A Number of shared capitalist pay schemes: esos, prp, group pbr
0 .499 .474 .438
1 .292 .291 .287
2 .156 .155 .184
3 .053 .080 .090
B Speciﬁ  c combinations of pay schemes
No shared capitalist pay .499 .474 .444
Single systems .292 .291 .281
  ESOS  only .035 .054 .047
  GRPP  only .049 .044 .040
  PRP  only .208 .194 .184
Two systems .156 .155 .190
  ESOS   GRPP .001 .010 .013
  ESOS   PRP .108 .060 .081
  GRPP   PRP .047 .085 .096
  All three   .053   .080   .094  
Source: Tabulated from the 1998–2004 WERS panel data ﬁ  le on workplaces.
Notes: Panel A; n  587 private sector workplaces in WERS panel. All data are survey 
weighted. Last column based on analyses by James Mitchell, NIESR, for which we are grate-
ful. Transition matrix A (in fact A to ensure each column sums to unity) is raised to the power 
2,000. Since one of A’s eigenvalues is unity we have an ergodic Markov chain and the long- run 
forecast is thus independent of the current state. Panel B; due to rounding, the rows of the 
transition matrix summed to 1.0001000 so we subtracted 0.0001 to ensure that they sum 
to unity. GRPP  group payments-  by-  results; ESOS  employee share ownership schemes; 
PRP  proﬁ  t-  related pay.
8. Models were estimated with survey-  weighted OLS. Results were not sensitive to the use 
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pay; and on dummy variables for the seven independent categories in the 
Venn diagram.
The dependent variable in columns (1) and (2) is a dichotomous measure 
of whether workers receive individual payment by results (see appendix). 
The estimated coeﬃcients show that individual pay by results is more likely 
in the presence of shared capitalist pay than otherwise. In column (1) the 
biggest eﬀects occur for group payment by results, indicating that these two 
forms of compensation are very closely linked. In column (2) the largest 
coeﬃcient occurs when workplaces have all three forms of shared capitalist 
pay. These results suggest that, as argued, individual and group payment for 
results are complements, though we have no reliable way with the WERS 
data to determine whether ﬁ  rms with the two modes of pay are in fact choos-
ing the optimal levels.
The dependent variable in columns (3) and (4) is merit pay, which is based on 
a subjective assessment of individual performance by a supervisor or manager. 
Again, there are indications of a positive association with share capitalism, 
but in this case it is conﬁ  ned to an association with proﬁ  t-  related pay.
Columns (5) and (6) measure employee autonomy in decision making as 
reported by human resource managers in response to a question regarding 
“the extent to which you would say that individuals in the largest occupa-
tional group: have variety in their work, discretion over how they do their 
work, control over the pace at which they work, involvement in decisions 
over how their work is organized?” The responses have a four-  point scale 
(“a lot, some, a little, none”), from which we formed a summated rating that 
went from 0 (“none” on all four items) to 12 (“a lot” on all four items).9 Ten 
percent of workplaces scored less than 5 on this scale, 47 percent scored 5 
to 8, and 44 percent scored 9 or more.
The regression coeﬃcients show modestly greater autonomy for worker 
decision making in the presence of shared capitalist pay than otherwise, with 
the primary impact coming through proﬁ  t- related pay in column (5) and the 
combination of proﬁ  t-  related pay and group payment for results in column 
(6). While it is dangerous to compare results from diﬀerent surveys across 
countries, the link between shared capitalist pay and employee decision mak-
ing seems weaker in the United Kingdom than in the United States.10
The dependent variable in columns (7) and (8) measures the extent of 
managerial monitoring of worker inputs. It is based on responses to ques-
tions about whether workplaces used managers or supervisors to monitor 
9. Factor analysis of these items produces a single factor with an eigenvalue of 2.21 and a 
Cronbach alpha of 0.73, suggesting that the items are aspects of a single construct.
10. As an alternative measure, we also examined employee responses to an analogous ques-
tion: “In general, how much inﬂ  uence do you have over the following. . . . What tasks you do in 
your job, the pace at which you work, how you do your work, the order in which you carry out 
tasks, the time you start or ﬁ  nish your working day?” with responses coded using an additive 
scale comparable to that used for employers. Because there were ﬁ  ve questions the scale ran 
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the quality of work, whether supervisors have the power to dismiss workers, 
and whether workplaces have a high percentage (20 percent ) of supervi-
sors among their employees, and on whether the ﬁ  rm reports that employees 
monitor the quality of their own output (in which case a point is deducted 
from this scale). This variable is scaled from 0 to 4 (see footnote to the table 
for details). The regression coeﬃcients show that shared capitalism is not 
signiﬁ  cantly associated with managerial monitoring of worker inputs.
The dependent variable in columns (9) and (10) is a measure of employer 
monitoring of outputs. It is based on questions regarding the use of inspec-
tors in separate departments, customer surveys, keeping records of faults 
and complaints, and the use of records to monitor labor productivity targets. 
This variable is scaled from 0 to 4. The regression coeﬃcients show that 
shared capitalist pay is strongly associated with more managerial monitor-
ing of outputs, with employee share schemes having the largest impact in 
column (9) and the presence of all three schemes or the combination of 
share schemes and group payments-  by-  results having the largest impact in 
column (10).
Finally, columns (11) and (12) examine the relation between employer 
use of appraisal systems of how workers are doing and shared capitalist 
pay. The measure of appraisal is an additive scale based on whether the 
ﬁ  rm appraises all nonmanagerial staﬀ, if appraisals occur half-  yearly or 
quarterly, and if nonmanagerial pay is linked to performance appraisal. 
This variable is scaled from 0 to 3. The positive regression coeﬃcient on the 
share ownership dummy variable in column (11) shows that workplaces with 
shared ownership modes of pay do more appraisal of employees than other 
workplaces. In column (12) the message is similar, with large coeﬃcients on 
the interaction relating to workplaces that have stock ownership and on the 
coeﬃcient on the “only share ownership” dummy variable.
The associations between shared capitalist compensation and the other 
policies and practices shown in these regressions do not tell us how man-
agement coordinates the various pay schemes to form a coherent working 
environment, but they do support the notion that shared capitalist arrange-
ments work best in conjunction with other innovations in the employment 
relationship consistent with the model we sketched out earlier.
6.5    Basic  Productivity  Relations
“Share ownership oﬀers employees a real stake in their company . . . 
encourage(s) the new enterprise culture of team work in which everyone 
contributes and everyone beneﬁ  ts from success. . . . Employee share own-
ership has a contribution to make towards increasing Britain’s productiv-
ity.” (HM Treasury 1998, 1–  2)
To see how shared capitalist modes of pay aﬀect productivity we estimate 
production functions. We have three measures of productivity. The ﬁ  rst mea-216    Alex Bryson and Richard B. Freeman
sure is an index based on the responses of human resource managers to 
the question: “Compared with other establishments in the same industry 
how would you assess your workplace’s labor productivity?” Responses are 
ordered in a ﬁ  ve- point scale from “a lot better than average” to “a lot below 
average”. Of the 1,512 human resource managers who answered this ques-
tion in the 2004 WERS, 6 percent thought their workplace’s productivity 
was either “below” or “a lot below average”11, 42 percent thought it was 
“average”, 42 percent thought it was “better than average,” and 10 percent 
described it as “a lot above average.” Most British studies of the eﬀect of 
modes of compensation on productivity have used questions of this form 
in their analyses.12
We supplement this measure with two accounting measures collected in 
the 2004 WERS by a Financial Performance Questionnaire (FPQ): gross 
output per worker (the ratio of total value of sales of goods and services over 
the past year to total employment); and gross value added per worker (the 
ratio of total sales minus the total value of purchases of goods, materials, 
and services divided by total employment).13 These measures are correlated 
with one another at 0.39. But they are not correlated with manager reports 
of productivity relative to the industry average, suggesting that the ﬁ  nancial 
performance questionnaire and human resource manager reports on pro-
ductivity contain diﬀerent information about the workplace.
Given these three measures, our ﬁ  rst inclination was to give more weight 
to the accounting measures in our productivity analysis. The accounting 
measures underlie standard production function regressions and are more 
objective than the management reports. But we quickly learned that the 
accounting measures have problems. Only 47 percent of workplaces par-
ticipating in WERS responded to the ﬁ  nancial performance questions, and 
some responses were such large outliers that we dropped them from the 
analysis.14 After trimming the top and bottom 2.5 percent of values, we 
had valid data for 586 workplaces for productivity measured as sales per 
employee and for 524 workplaces for productivity measured as value added 
per employee.15 This reduced our sample by about 60 percent. We will give 
roughly equal weight to the three estimates in our assessment of the eﬀects 
of shared capitalism on productivity.
Table 6.5 gives the coeﬃcients for the association between the three mea-
11. We collapsed the responses “a lot below” and “below average” into a single category due 
to the small number of responses in that part of the distribution.
12. Kersley et al. (2006, 287–  89) compare alternative productivity measures.
13. The FPQ questionnaire is: www.wers2004.info/ wers2004/ crosssection.php#fpq. Chaplin 
et al. (2005) describe the data and administration of the questionnaire.
14. Most of the data relate to an accounting period ending in 2004, with some data relat-
ing to a period ending in 2003. Where data did not relate to a full calendar year we adjusted 
accordingly.
15. The estimation samples are a little lower because we dropped a few observations with 
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sures of productivity and the incidence and intensity of shared capitalist 
pay in terms of the proportion of workers covered. All models are run with 
sampling weights that are the inverse of the probability of sample selection. 
The weights for the models that use the ﬁ  nancial performance questionnaire 
data also adjust for nonresponse, as described in Chaplin et al. (2005). We 
use a robust estimator to account for heteroskedasticity. The coeﬃcients in 
models (1) and (2) are from ordered probits for the subjective measure of 
Table 6.5  Coeﬃcients and t-  statistics relating manager reports of productivity, Ln sales/
employee and Ln value added/employee to shared capitalist pay schemes
Management 
view of lab 
prod
Management 










    (1)   (2)   (3)   (4)   (5)   (6)
GRPP 0.042 0.031 0.001 0.005 0.001 –0.000
(0.34) (0.25) (0.01) (0.04) (0.06) (0.03)
PRP 0.113 –0.040 –0.003
(1.09) (0.33) (0.31)
ESOS 0.305 0.436 0.033
(2.28)∗ (2.90)∗∗ (2.75)∗∗
PRP (ref: none)
 1–99%  covered –0.149 0.033 0.026
(0.81) (0.18) (1.96)
 100%  covered 0.269 –0.284 –0.015
(2.09)∗ (1.63) (1.78)
ESOS (ref: none)
 Managers  only 0.180 0.475 –0.001
(0.95) (2.05)∗ (0.05)
 1–99%  nonmanagers  0.032 0.274 0.009
  covered (0.11) (1.43) (0.47)
 100%  nonmanagers  0.356 0.513 0.045
  covered (2.36)∗ (2.96)∗∗ (3.24)∗∗
Cut 1:Constant –0.960 –0.983
(2.48)∗ (2.56)∗
Cut 2:Constant 0.702 0.687
(1.77) (1.75)
Cut 3:Constant 2.196 2.189
(5.43)∗∗ (5.45)∗∗
Constant 4.523 4.546 6.553 6.551
(13.93)∗∗ (14.14)∗∗ (227.88)∗∗ (240.53)∗∗
Observations 1,487 1,486 577 577 517 517
R2           0.54   0.55   0.34   0.37
Notes: Control variables are as per table 6.4 except that the monitoring and appraisal variables were entered 
separately rather than additive scales and individual PBR and merit pay are included as controls.
∗∗∗Signiﬁ  cant at the 1 percent level.
∗∗Signiﬁ  cant at the 5 percent level.
∗Signiﬁ  cant at the 10 percent level.218    Alex Bryson and Richard B. Freeman
labor productivity relative to the industry average. The coeﬃcients in models 
(3) and (4) and in models (5) and (6) are from linear regression models for 
log sales per employee and log value added per employee, respectively.
The odd-  numbered columns give the results for the incidence of shared 
capitalist forms of pay. They show share ownership schemes are positively 
associated with labor productivity on all three productivity measures while 
neither proﬁ  t-  related pay nor group pay for performance have any notice-
able relation to productivity. The even-  numbered columns give the results 
when the measure of shared capitalist pay considers the coverage of the pay 
system—whether it includes all workers or just management and perhaps 
a select few others. They show that the stock ownership schemes that enlist 
all employees raise productivity by all three of our measures, while schemes 
targeted at managers only are positively associated with sales per employee. 
Again, the other forms of shared capitalism have little relation to the mea-
sures of productivity.
6.6    Complementarity  in  Production
For our production function test of the complementarity of shared capi-
talist forms of pay, we regressed each of our measures of productivity on 
dummy variables for the seven independent categories in the Venn diagram. 
The calculations in table 6.6 summarize the results. There is evidence for 
complementarity in the eﬀects with each of the measures of productivity, 
but the particular mixture of pay systems that have the largest impact on 
productivity diﬀers among the productivity measures.
In the regression for managers’ perception of productivity the biggest 
impacts occur when workplaces have all three forms of pay, or have employee 
share ownership and proﬁ  t-  related pay or employee ownership and group 
payments-  by-  results. This indicates that the positive impact of share own-
ership found in table 6.5 occurs when share ownership is combined with 
proﬁ  t-  related pay or group payments-  by-  results.
By contrast, in the regression in which productivity is measured by sales 
per worker, the biggest impacts on productivity occur when workplaces have 
employee share ownership and proﬁ  t-  related pay or employee ownership 
and group pay for results. Having share ownership by itself does better than 
having all the schemes together.
The interactions are weakest in the value added regression, with the big-
gest impacts occurring when workplaces combine employee share ownership 
with group pay for results followed by combining it with proﬁ  t-  related pay.
Finally, if we simplify the regressions by replacing the share ownership 
interactions with a single dummy identifying share ownership in combina-
tion with group payments- by- results and/ or proﬁ  t- related pay, the dummy is 
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combinations of shared capitalism systems that include share ownership are 
positively correlated with productivity, however we measure it.16
6.7      Comparison with Prior Literature and Oxera-  Treasury
Our production function study follows a long line of UK analyses of 
the eﬀects of shared capitalism. Many analysts have used earlier waves of 
Table 6.6  Coeﬃcients and t-  statistics for the eﬀects of complementarity among 
shared capitalist pay and other workplace arrangements on managers’ 
reports of productivity (labrod), Ln sales/employee (lnte) and Ln value 
added/employee (lngvae)
labprod lnte lngvae
      (1)   (2)   (3)  
ESOS  PRP  GRPP 0.505 0.119 0.011
(2.51)∗ (0.46) (0.57)
ESOS  PRP 0.550 0.647 0.041
(2.55)∗ (2.89)∗∗ (1.77)
ESOS  GRPP 0.480 0.782 0.082
(1.93) (2.36)∗ (2.38)∗
PRP  GRPP –0.020 0.034 0.002
(0.10) (0.19) (0.20)
ESOS only 0.067 0.301 0.004
(0.32) (1.94) (0.27)
GRPP only 0.212 0.063 –0.018
(1.14) (0.30) (1.56)










Observations 1,490 578 518
  R2       0.55   0.36  
Note: controls are as per table 6.5.
∗∗∗Signiﬁ  cant at the 1 percent level.
∗∗Signiﬁ  cant at the 5 percent level.
∗Signiﬁ  cant at the 10 percent level.
16. The coeﬃcients and t- statistics for share capitalist bundles incorporating share ownership 
are 0.492 (2.96) for managers’ assessments of productivity, 0.444 (2.12) for sales per employee, 
and 0.035 (2.10) for value added per employee.220    Alex Bryson and Richard B. Freeman
the WERS to examine the eﬀects of various forms of shared capitalism on 
manager reports of ﬁ  nancial outcomes or labor productivity. Some have 
used surveys of particular sectors with quantitative measures of productiv-
ity such as sales or value added, often within the order of 100 ﬁ  rms. Bryson 
and Freeman (2007) and Oxera in its analysis for the UK Treasury (Oxera 
2007a, appendix 2) summarize this work. The two reviews show that the 
majority of studies ﬁ  nd positive eﬀects of shared capitalist pay on produc-
tivity or ﬁ  nancial outcomes, while some ﬁ  nd negligible eﬀects, and virtually 
none ﬁ  nd negative eﬀects.17 They also ﬁ  nd that the pay schemes that have 
positive eﬀects vary across studies and sometimes within the same study 
depending on the measure of outcomes or data under analysis.
After we completed our research, the Treasury released a study that comes 
as close as we could imagine to giving a deﬁ  nitive analysis of the eﬀects of 
tax- advantaged modes of shared capitalism on productivity. This study has 
the largest sample of any done in the United Kingdom—16,844 ﬁ  rms—
obtained by matching HM Revenue and Customs’ administrative data on 
Approved Proﬁ  t Sharing systems, SAYE systems, and CSOP systems to 
measures of productivity based on sales from the Financial Analysis Made 
Easy (FAME) data set. In addition, the Oxera- Treasury study obtained mea-
sures of productivity for 7,633 companies based on value added from the 
Annual Respondents Database (ARD) provided by the Oﬃce of National 
Statistics. The Oxera- Treasury study covered enough years and ﬁ  rms to per-
mit a panel analysis with ﬁ  xed eﬀects as well as cross section comparisons 
of ﬁ  rms with and without particular schemes.
The results of the Oxera-  Treasury study conﬁ  rm the ﬁ  nding in our study 
and in the bulk of the earlier literature that shared capitalism raises pro-
ductivity. When the study measures output by sales “on average, across the 
whole sample, the eﬀect of tax-  advantaged share schemes is signiﬁ  cant and 
increases productivity by 2.5% in the long run” (Oxera 2007a, 3). It also 
ﬁ  nds important complementarities in the eﬀects that are consistent with our 
results: “there are further beneﬁ  ts to be gained from operating several types 
of schemes,” with gains accruing primarily to companies that have both tax 
advantaged and not tax-  advantaged schemes; and with large gains for the 
SAYE share ownership scheme.
With its large sample size and use of panel data as well as cross section 
data, the Oxera- Treasury analysis has arguably generated the strongest ﬁ  nd-
ings thus far on the eﬀects of shared capitalism in the United Kingdom. 
Surprisingly perhaps given the sample size, the Oxera- Treasury study reports 
variation in results that resemble those in our study and others using smaller 
data sets: lower estimated productivity gains when output is measured with 
17. A count of the studies in the Oxera report shows that ten of the thirteen that estimated 
the eﬀects of proﬁ  t sharing found that it was associated with higher productivity while seven 
of the ten studies that examined share ownership found that it was associated with higher 
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value added than with sales; diﬀerent estimated eﬀects across sectors; and 
diﬀerent estimates of which schemes matter most when output is measured 
in value added than when output is measured in sales. The study notes that 
it lacks information on coverage of schemes or on other business practices 
of ﬁ  rms (as in the WERS) that could cast additional light on the impacts 
of the schemes.
6.8    Conclusion
In sum, shared capitalism has grown in the United Kingdom, as it has in 
the United States; ﬁ  rms use various forms of shared capitalist pay together 
and often accompany them with other labor practices, consistent with the 
complementary hypothesis. But ﬁ  rms switch among schemes frequently, 
which suggests that they have trouble optimizing and that the transactions 
cost of switching are relatively low. Among the single schemes, share owner-
ship has the clearest positive association with productivity, but its impact 
is largest when ﬁ  rms combine it with other forms of shared capitalist pay. 
Given that even the large sample Oxera-  Treasury study ﬁ  nds sizable varia-
tion across groups, schemes, and measures of productivity, additional studies 
using administrative data or the richer but smaller WERS ﬁ  les are unlikely to 
greatly advance our knowledge of what makes shared capitalism work in the 
United Kingdom. To advance our knowledge further would seem to require 
studies that focus speciﬁ  cally on shared capitalist ﬁ  rms, such as the NBER 
data set fourteen-  ﬁ  rm study used in other chapters of this book, with ques-
tions and case analyses directed at particular hypotheses about the detailed 
operation of shared capitalist programs in corporations.
Appendix
Survey Questions Used to Derive Share Capitalism Variables
The share capitalism measures are derived from the following survey ques-
tions.
Payments- by- Results  (PBR)
“Do any of the employees in this establishment get paid by results or 
receive merit pay? On this card is an explanation of what we mean by 
payment-  by-  results and merit pay.”
Card reads:
1.  Payment- by- results
“Payment-  by-  results” includes any method of payment where the pay is 
determined by the amount done or its value, rather than just the number of 222    Alex Bryson and Richard B. Freeman
hours worked. It includes commission, and bonuses that are determined by 
individual, establishment, or organization productivity or performance. It 
does not include proﬁ  t-  related pay schemes.
2. Merit  pay
“Merit pay” is related to a subjective assessment of individual performance 
by a supervisor or manager.
Follow-  up questions establish the occupations covered by PBR and the 
percentage of nonmanagerial employees covered. In addition, the follow-
ing question establishes whether PBR is calculated at individual, group, or 
organization level:
“Thinking just about payment by results, what /   What) measures of per-
formance are used to determine the amount that employees receive?”
PROBE: Which others? UNTIL “None”.
1. Individual  performance/  output
2.  Group or team performance/  output
3. Workplace-  based  measures
4. Organization-  based  measures
5. Other  measures
Proﬁ  t-  Related Pay
“Do any employees at this workplace receive proﬁ  t-  related payments or 
proﬁ  t-  related bonuses?”
Follow-  up questions establish the occupations covered by PRP, the per-
centage of nonmanagerial employees covered, and the percentage in receipt 
of PRP payments. In addition, the following question establishes the organi-
zational level at which PRP is calculated if the workplace is part of a larger 
organization:
“For what part of your organization is the amount of proﬁ  t-  related pay 
calculated. . . . Workplace, Division/  Subsidiary company, Organization as 
a whole?”
Share Schemes
“Does this company operate any of the employee share schemes listed on 
this card for any of the employees at this workplace?”
PROBE: Which others? UNTIL “None.”
1.  Share Incentive Plan (SIP)
2.  Save As You Earn (SAYE or Sharesave)
3.  Enterprise Management Incentives (EMI)
4.  Company Share Option Plan (CSOP)
5.  Other employee share scheme
6.  None of these
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1. Share Incentive Plan (SIP)—a tax and NIC advantaged plan where 
employees can purchase shares and companies can give employees free 
shares or matching shares.
2.  Save As You Earn (SAYE or Sharesave) share options scheme—tax 
advantaged scheme where employees save to purchase their employer’s 
shares.
3.  Enterprise Management Incentives (EMI)—where smaller companies 
can grant up to a total of £3 million of tax and National Insurance Contri-
butions (NIC) advantaged share options to their employees.
4. Company Share Option Plan (CSOP)—where companies can grant 
each of their employees up to £30,000 of tax and NIC advantaged share 
options.
5.  Other employee share scheme.
Subsequent questions identify the occupations eligible for share owner-
ship schemes and the percentage participating in schemes.
Recent Introduction of Performance-  Related Pay
Over the past two years has management here introduced any of the 
changes listed on this card?
PROBE: Which others? UNTIL “None”.
1.  Introduction of performance-  related pay
2.  Introduction or upgrading of computers
3.  Introduction or upgrading of other types of new technology
4.  Changes in working time arrangements
5.  Changes in the organization of work
6.  Changes in work techniques or procedures
7.  Introduction of initiatives to involve employees
8.  Introduction of technologically new or signiﬁ  cantly improved product 
or service
9.  None of these
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